The Relational Right and the Good

Deontological theories interpret moral requirements as constraining the agent’s pursuit of independently valuable ends; the right is in this way taken to be prior to the good. This interpretation of the moral right does not preclude appeal to evaluative notions, but the role of evaluative conceptions within a deontological approach to morality remains poorly understood. My aim in this talk is to offer some constructive suggestions about the deontological conception of moral value, taking the relational account as my example of a deontological approach. I shall identify two different kinds of moral values that might be elucidated by the relational approach, which I shall call compliance values and existence values. I shall also discuss the role that these moralized values play within the relational theory, tracing the contributions they make to the larger interpretative case for understanding interpersonal morality in relational terms.

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