“Hallucination, Factivity, and Epistemology of Perception”.

A traditional view in perceptual epistemology holds that it makes no difference at all to an agent’s justification, that the agent is hallucinating, provided that it’s a hallucination that’s phenomenally or introspectively indistinguishable from a veridical perception. More recently, several epistemologists have endorsed an “epistemological disjunctivism,” according to which the mere fact that one is hallucinating results in significant reduction in justification, even if everything else is exactly the same. I endorse a view in between these, arguing that some but not all hallucinations suffer from reduced justification, not because of hallucination per se but because of the way in which that particular hallucination is brought about. I try to show that this view is preferable to the two others, especially the disjunctivist view.