

Articles, Book Chapters, and Book Reviews by Gary Ebbs
January 11, 2025

Articles and Book Chapters

45. "Kripke and Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning," in Claudine Verheggen, ed., *Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40* (Cambridge University Press, 2024), pp. 107–123.
44. "Reading Quine's Claim that Carnap's Term 'Semantical Rule' is Meaningless," in Sean Morris, ed., *The Philosophical Project of Carnap and Quine* (Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. 135–153.
43. "Quine's Naturalism: Neither 'Reductive' nor 'Liberal'," in Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds., *The Routledge Handbook on Liberal Naturalism* (Routledge, 2022), pp. 97–109.
42. "Putnam on Trans-theoretical Terms and Contextual Apriority," in James Conant and Sanjit Chakraborty, eds., *Engaging Putnam* (De Gruyter, 2022), pp. 131–155.
41. "Ginsborg's Reading of Wittgenstein on Rules and Normativity," *Philosophical Investigations*. Online prepublication, October 2021. DOI: 10.1111/phin.12334
40. "Hilary Putnam's Liberal Naturalism about Language Use, Reference, and Truth," *The Monist* 103(4), October 2020, pp. 357–369.
39. "Analyticity: the Carnap–Quine Debate and its Aftermath," in Becker and Thomson, eds., *Cambridge History of Philosophy: 1945–2015*, Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 32–48.
38. "Carnap on Analyticity and Existence: A Clarification, Defense, and Development of Quine's Reading of Carnap's Views on Ontology," *Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy*, 7(5), September 2019, pp. 1–62
37. "Quine on the Norms of Naturalized Epistemology," in Robert Sinclair, ed., *Science and Sensibilia by W.V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2019), pp. 115–136
36. "First-Order Logical Validity and the Hilbert-Bernays Theorem," co-authored with Warren Goldfarb, in *Philosophical Issues*, 28 (2018), pp. 159–175
35. "Carnap on Ontology," in Ebbs, *Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry* (Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 33–54
34. "Reading Quine's Claim that Definitional Abbreviations Create Synonymies," in Ebbs, *Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry* (Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 168–187
33. "Putnam on Methods of Inquiry," in *Argumenta* 3 (December 2016): 157–161; and (with slight changes) in *The Harvard Review of Philosophy* 24 (Fall 2017): 121–125
32. "Rules and Rule-Following," in Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman, eds., *A Companion to Wittgenstein* (Wiley-Blackwell 2017), pp. 390–406
31. "How to Think about Whether We are Brains in a Vat," in S. Goldberg, ed., *The Brain in a Vat* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 27–36
30. "Quine's 'Predilection' for Finitism," *Metascience* 15(1) (2016): 31–36. First published online in 2015.
29. "Reading Quine's Claim that No Statement is Immune to Revision," in Janssen-Lauret and Kemp, eds., *Quine and his Place in History* (Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2016), pp. 123–145
28. "Introduction to 'Preestablished Harmony' and 'Response to Gary Ebbs'," in Janssen-Lauret and Kemp, eds., *Quine and his Place in History* (Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2016), pp. 21–28

27. "Satisfying Predicates: Kleene's Proof of the Hilbert-Bernays Theorem," *History and Philosophy of Logic*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (April 2015), pp. 346–366.
26. "On Knowing What Thoughts One's Utterances Express," in S. Goldberg, ed., *Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 165–183
25. "Putnam and the Contextually A Priori," in Lewis E. Hahn and Randall E. Auxier, eds., *The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam*, part of *The Library of Living Philosophers* series, (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2015), pp. 389–411
24. "Conditionalization and Conceptual Change: Chalmers in Defense of a Dogma," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 111, No. 12, December 2014: 689–703
23. "Can First-Order Logical Truth be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?" *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, Volume 22, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 343-367
22. "Quine's Naturalistic Explication of Carnap's Logic of Science," in Gilbert Harman and Ernest Lepore (eds.), *A Companion to W.V.O Quine* (Blackwell 2014), pp. 465-482
21. "Mendola's Internalism," in *Analytic Philosophy*, Vol. 54, No. 2, June 2013: 248-257
20. "Davidson's Explication of Meaning," in Gerhard Preyer, ed., *Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental* (Oxford University Press, 2012)
19. "The Dialectical Context of Putnam's Argument that We are Not Brains in Vats," in Ebbs and Brueckner, *Debating Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 66-82
18. "Self-Knowledge in Doubt," in Ebbs and Brueckner, *Debating Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 186-216
17. "Quine Gets the Last Word," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 108, Issue 11 (November 2011): 617-632
16. "Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention," *Mind*, Volume 120, Number 478 (April 2011): 193-237.
15. "Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: A Clarification and Defense of a Puzzle About Doubt," in A. Hatzimoysis, ed., *Self-Knowledge* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 53-79
14. "Why Skepticism About Self-Knowledge is Self-Undermining," *Analysis*, Volume 65, Number 3 (2005)
13. Addendum to "Rule Following," in Donald M. Borchert, ed., *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd edition (New York: Macmillan, 2005)
12. "Denotation and Discovery," in Frederick F. Schmitt, ed., *Socializing Metaphysics: the Nature of Social Reality* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003)
11. "A Puzzle about Doubt," in Susana Nuccetelli, ed., *New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge* (MIT, 2003)
10. "Learning from Others," *Noûs*, Volume 36, Number 4 (2002): 525-549
9. "Truth and Trans-Theoretical Terms," in James Conant and Urszula Zeglen, eds., *Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism* (London: Routledge, 2002), 167-185, and (translated into Polish) in Urszula Zeglen, ed., *Pragmatism and Hilary Putnam's Philosophy* (Torun: Nicolas Copernicus University Press, 2001), 195-225
8. "Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?" *Philosophical Studies* 105 (2001): 43-58
7. "Carnap's Logical Syntax," in Richard Gaskin, ed., *Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2001), 218-237
6. "Vagueness, Sharp Boundaries, and Supervenience Conditions," *Synthese* 127 (2001): 303-323
5. "The Very Idea of Sameness of Extension Across Time," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Volume 37, Number 3 (2000): 245-268

4. "Bilgrami's Theory of Belief and Meaning," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Volume 58, Number 3 (1998): 613-620
3. "Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Volume 56, Number 3 (1996): 499-530
2. "Realism and Rational Inquiry," *Philosophical Topics*, Volume 20, Number 1 (1992): 1-33
1. "Skepticism, Objectivity, and Brains in Vats," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, Volume 73, Number 3 (1992): 239-266

Book Reviews

Review of *Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism*, by Sander Verhaegh. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, September 2019

Review of *Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science*, by Greg Frost-Arnold, *History and Philosophy of Logic*, June 2014

Review of *The Themes of Quine's Philosophy: Meaning, Reference, and Knowledge*, by Edward Becker. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, May 2013

Review of *Pursuit of Truth*, rev. ed., by W. V. Quine, *The Philosophical Review*, Volume 103, Number 3 (1994): 535-541