**James “Andrew” Smith Jr., PhD**

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<https://philpeople.org/profiles/james-andrew-smith>

**Education**

Indiana University, Bloomington

Ph.D. in Philosophy, minor in Logic, August 31st, 2020. M.A. in Philosophy, June 30th, 2015.

University of Florida

B.A. in Philosophy *summa cum laude* and Linguistics, May 7th, 2013.

**Employment**

Indiana University, Bloomington

Visiting Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, 2021-2022 and 2022-2023 academic year

DePauw University

Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, 2020-2021 academic year

**Research**

*Areas of Specialization*: History of Analytic Philosophy, Epistemology, Metaphysics

*Areas of Competence*: Philosophy of Language, Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy of Mathematics, General Philosophy of Science

**Papers and Reviews**

*Articles*

“Methodology Maximized: Quine on Empiricism, Naturalism, and Empirical Content.”

*Journal of the History of Philosophy.* 60(4): 661–86. 2022. [View or download pre-print](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ee7qsv407mocotm/Methodology%20Maximized%20James%20Andrew%20Smith%20preprint%204.12.22.pdf?dl=0).

“Carnap and Quine on Sense and Nonsense.” *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy.* 9(10): 1–28. 2021. [Open access](https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4743).

“Quine on Naturalism, Nominalism, and Philosophy’s Place within Science.”

*Synthese* 198(2): 1549–1567. 2021. [Online with read-only open access](https://rdcu.be/bnCDO).

“Quine’s Intuition: Why Quine’s Early Nominalism is Naturalistic.”

*Erkenntnis* 85(5): 1199–1218. 2020. [Online with read-only open access](https://rdcu.be/bbLA9).

*Reviews*

“Quine—structuralism and all.” (Review of *Quine, Structure, and Ontology,* ed. Frederique Janssen-Lauret). *Metascience* 30 (2): pp. 285-288. 2021. [Online with read-only open access](https://rdcu.be/cjCVp).

Review of *Quine and His Place in History,* eds. Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Gary Kemp. *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* 7(7): pp. 19-24. 2019*.* [Open access](https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4146).

**Short Dissertation Abstract: *Science as the Pursuit of Truth: On Quine’s Naturalism***

(*Director:* Gary Ebbs. *Committee Members:* Joan Weiner, Kirk Ludwig, Larry Moss, and Richard Creath)

My dissertation is about W.V. Quine’s naturalism—the recommendation that we judge truth only within our best scientific theories, guided only by scientific methods—and its ramifications for epistemology and the methodology of science, mathematics, and philosophy. It is guided by two claims. First, Quine has no general criteria for what counts as scientific because he believes that scientific methodology admits of few principles that are both exact and which are applicable in all disciplines; in short, it is highly context sensitive. Second, Quine believes the naturalistic philosopher is a participant in scientific inquiry who does not always defer to scientists outside philosophy and who aims to improve our scientific theories. I use these claims to remove the misunderstanding that Quine’s naturalistic ontology is deferential, clarify his empiricism and his epistemology of set theory in light of his highly context-sensitive methodology, and compare his views on cognitive meaningfulness and scientific language to the views of his teacher, Rudolf Carnap.

**Conferences**

*Presentations* (‘\*’ indicates invited presentations via an anonymized review process.)

“McCarty contra Carnap and Quine.”\* Indiana Philosophical Association, November 12th-13th, 2021, at Indiana University, Bloomington.

“Conventional Truth without Truth by Convention.” Faculty Colloquium, October 15th, 2021, Indiana University, Bloomington.

“Quine’s Unpublished 1985 Typescript ‘Convention and Its Place in Truth’.”\* Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, July 14th-16th 2021, online via the University of Vienna.

“Epistemology of Logic First: Against Warren’s Defense of Charity in Logic.” 1) Central States Philosophical Association, October 19th, 2019, at Washington University, St. Louis in St. Louis, MO.\*

2) Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, February 26th-29th, 2020, in Chicago, IL.\*

“Quine on Set Theory: Stipulation or Explanation?” 1) Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, June 17th-19th, 2019, at Boston University in Boston, MA.\* 2) Society for Exact Philosophy, May 17th-19th, 2019 at York University in Toronto, ON.\* 3) Indiana University Logic Colloquium, February 6th, 2019.

“Quine’s Methodology.” Nelson Dissertation Fellowship Presentation, April 12th, 2019, Indiana University, Bloomington.

“Charity and Explaining My Logical Truths: Problems for Jared Warren’s Conventionalism.”\* Indiana Philosophical Association, November 17th-18th, 2018, at Indiana University, Bloomington in Bloomington, IN.

“Re-revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention.” Society for Exact Philosophy, May 18th-20th, 2018, at University of Connecticut, in Storrs, CT.\*

“Science and Significance in Carnap and Quine.” January 2018, Indiana University Graduate Student Colloquium.

“Quine’s Intuition.” 1) Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, May 8th-10th 2017, at University of Calgary, in Calgary, AB, Canada.\* 2) March 2017, Indiana University Graduate Student Colloquium

“Science as the Pursuit of Truth: On Quinean Naturalism.” Society for Exact Philosophy, May 5th-7th, 2017, at University of Calgary in Calgary, AB, Canada.\*

“Frege’s Conversion.” Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, June 16th-18th 2016, at Metropolitan State University Denver in Denver, CO.\* (Paper also accepted at Society for Exact Philosophy, May 6th-8th, 2016, at Miami University in Coral Gables, FL., but declined to present for monetary reasons)\*

 “Quine on Truth by Convention in Set Theory,” with Gary Ebbs. 1) Philosophical Collaborations conference, March 19th-20th, 2015, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale in Carbondale, IL. 2) June 2015, Indiana University Graduate Student Colloquium.

*Comments*

“Conservativeness and the Neo-Fregean Program.”  Stephen Mackereth, Eastern Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Baltimore, MD, January 6th, 2022.

“Meta-ontology as Normative Sociology.” Patrick Rardin, Indiana Philosophical Association, online, April 9th-10th 2021

 “Normative Bedrock and Non-Normative Content.” Kevin Mills, Indiana Philosophical Association, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, November 17th-18th, 2018.

*Chairing*

“Kant’s Argument from Incongruent Counterparts Revisited.” Rima Hussein, Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, IL, February 23rd-26th, 2022.

**Teaching**

Teaching Experience

*At Indiana University, 2021-2022 academic year and Fall 2022:*

P106 Introduction to Problems of Philosophy [Introduction to Philosophy], Fall 2021, Spring 2022 (two sections), Fall 2022

P105 Critical Thinking, Fall 2021, Spring 2022, Fall 2022 (two sections)

P105 Elementary Logic [lower-level logic course on propositional logic], Fall 2021

*At DePauw University, 2020-2021 academic year:*

PHIL101B: Introduction to Philosophy, Fall 2020 and Spring 2021

PHIL233A: Ethics and Business, Fall 2020 and Spring 2021

PHIL309A: Topics: Science, Proof, and Paradox (Philosophy of Science and Mathematics), Fall 2020

PHIL209A: Topics: Philosophy and Climate Change, Spring 2021

*At Indiana University as a graduate student:*

As sole instructor

P145 Liberty and Justice (an introduction to social and political philosophy), Spring 2020

P107 Philosophy and the Environment, Fall 2019

P240 Business and Morality: Ethics in Context, Spring 2018

P240 Business and Morality: Ethics in Context, Fall 2017

P140 Introduction to Ethics, Fall 2016

As teaching assistant (graded and taught Friday discussion sections, head instructor indicated)

P100 Introduction to Philosophy, Frederick Schmitt, Spring 2017

P140 Introduction to Ethics, Marcia Baron, Spring 2016

P100 Introduction to Philosophy, Adam Leite, Fall 2015

P105 Critical Thinking, David Charles McCarty, Spring 2015

P105 Critical Thinking, David Charles McCarty, Fall 2014

Grader and assistant (head instructor indicated)

P505 Logical Theory I (graduate level logic course covering basic ideas and fundamental results of logical theory and set theory), David Charles McCarty, Fall 2018

P351 Logic of Sets, David Charles McCarty, Fall 2017 (undergraduate set theory course)

P352 Logic and Philosophy, Joan Weiner, Spring 2016

P251 Intermediate Symbolic Logic, Joan Weiner, Spring 2016

P505 Logical Theory I (graduate level logic course covering soundness and completeness of classical propositional and predicate logic; material different from when taught in Fall 2018), David Charles McCarty, Fall 2015

Courses I Can Teach

*Introductory courses:*

Introduction to Ethics

Business Ethics

Introduction to Philosophy

Critical Thinking

Environmental Ethics and/or Climate Ethics

Social and Political Philosophy

Philosophy of Race (given time to prepare)

Philosophy of Sex and Gender (given time to prepare)

Feminist Philosophy (given time to prepare)

Linguistics

*Intermediate or advanced undergraduate or graduate-level courses:*

Symbolic Logic

Ancient Philosophy (given time to prepare)

Introduction to Modern Philosophy (given time to prepare)

Philosophy of Science

Epistemology

Metaphysics

Philosophy of Language

Philosophy of Mathematics

History of Analytic Philosophy

Undergraduate introduction to set theory

Intermediate and advanced logical theory

Other Teaching Activities

1. Soon to obtain a certificate from a faculty course at Indiana University called “Teaching for Student Success: An Evidence-Based Approach” with a focus in Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Justice. 2. Attended 2021 ThinkerAnalytix conference remotely, on teaching philosophy students argument mapping. 3. Attended 2018 American Association of Philosophy Teachers workshop at Indiana University, Bloomington.

**Service**

**Service for Journals and Conferences**

Referee for *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* (x3), *Erkenntnis* (x2), *Inquiry* (x2), *Philosopher’s Imprint* (x1), *Philosophical Quarterly* (x1), *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* (x1), *Acta Analytica* (x1), Indiana Philosophical Association (x2).

**Service for Academic Presses**

Reviewed book proposal by Broadview Press for book on climate change

**Professional Memberships**

American Philosophical Association

Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy

Society for Exact Philosophy

**Professional Experience**

President, Graduate Association of Students in Philosophy, August 2017-August 2018.

*Tasks:* Served as a liaison between graduate students and faculty; attended general faculty meetings as a voting member on behalf of graduate students (including a vote for a departmental hire); helped to organize graduate student workshops on dissertation research and alternatives to academic careers; engaged in activism on behalf of philosophy graduate students with the IU Graduate and Professional Student Organization against the House of Representative’s proposal in 2017 to increase substantially graduate student taxation; helped to author a new constitution for our organization in order to register it with the university; worked closely with the philosophy department’s climate committee to address intradepartmental climate issues and to discuss the result of our yearly climate survey of graduate students.

Social Chair and Visiting Speaker Coordinator, Graduate Association of Students in Philosophy, August 2016-August 2017. *Tasks:* Arranging lunches for graduate students to meet with invited speakers, arranging and facilitating social events for graduate students

Graduate Student Assistant to Undergraduates Applying to Graduate Programs, Fall 2016 and Fall 2017. *Tasks:* Met with Frederick Schmitt and students at IU planning to apply to philosophy graduate programs, offering advice and answering questions.

Graduate Student Admissions Representative, August 2014-August 2015. *Tasks:* helped organize prospective student Welcome Weekend in March 2015, fielded and responded to prospective student e-mails throughout the year about the IU Philosophy graduate program, helped incoming students transition into the program.

Research Assistant: (1) Helped to prepare the typescript for Gary Ebbs’s book, *Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry,* Summer 2017. (2) Helped to prepare typescript of collection of Dana Scott papers with David Charles McCarty, Summer 2015 (3) Various tasks for Adam Leite, Summer and Fall 2019.

**Awards and Honors**

**Fellowships**

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Dissertation Completion Fellowship, 2020-2021. Declined.

James B. Nelson Dissertation Fellowship, 2018-2019.

Irving and Shirley Brand University Graduate Fellowship*,* 2016-2017.

First-Year College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Fellowship, 2013-2014

**Prizes**

Bo and Lynn Clark Memorial Essay Prize for IU Philosophy Graduate Students for “Quine on Naturalism, Nominalism, and Philosophy’s Place within Science,” May 2019

Indiana University College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Travel Award for Spring 2019 and Fall 2019

Indiana University College Arts and Humanities Institute Travel Award for Fall 2019

Bo and Lynn Clark Memorial Essay Prize for IU Philosophy First and Second Year Graduate Students for “Quine on Truth by Convention in Set Theory,” May 2015

Department of Philosophy Graduate Academic Excellence Award, May 2015

Graduate Coursework

‘\*’ marks an audit. All courses taken at Indiana University, Bloomington unless otherwise indicated. Classes in each area ordered from most to least recently taken or audited.

*Metaphysics and Epistemology*

Self-Knowledge (Adam Leite)\*

Free Will (Timothy O’Connor)\*

Hinge Epistemology (Adam Leite)\*

Ontology and Metaontology (Gary Ebbs)\*

Models in Science (Elisabeth Lloyd)\*

Decision Theory and Philosophy (Mark Kaplan)

Science and Semantics (Joan Weiner)

External World Skepticism (Adam Leite)

Collective Action (Kirk Ludwig)

*History of Philosophy*

Epistemology Austin’s Way (Mark Kaplan)\*

Kant’s Ethics (Allen Wood)\*

Hume’s Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind (Frederick Schmitt)\*

19th C. Social and Political Philosophy (Allen Wood, undergraduate course)\*

Wittgenstein (Kirk Ludwig, undergraduate course)\*

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Allen Wood)

Frege (Joan Weiner)

Aristotle’s Ethics and Political Philosophy (Pieter Hasper)

Carnap and Quine (Gary Ebbs)

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Sandra Shapshay)

Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (Gene Witmer, U. of Florida)

*Logic*

Modal Logic\* (Lawrence Moss)

Semantics (Thomas Grano)

Recursion Theory\* (Lawrence Moss)

Set Theory (Lawrence Moss)

Logical Theory II (computability, undecidability, and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems) (David Charles McCarty)

Logical Theory I (soundness and completeness of classical propositional and predicate logic) (David Charles McCarty)

*Value Theory*

Meta-Ethics (Stephanie Leary)\*

Philosophy of Art (Sandra Shapshay)\*

Ethical Theory (Marcia Baron

Dissertation Abstract: *Science as the Pursuit of Truth: On Quine’s Naturalism*

W.V. Quine accepts what he calls *naturalism,* the recommendation that we judge truth only within our best current scientific theories, guided only by scientific methods. Many philosophers are sympathetic to this striking and influential view; others wish to reject it. But whichever way we go, we first need to understand it. The aim of my dissertation is to clarify Quine’s naturalism by investigating its ramifications for methodology – how we inquirers are to justify, expand, and revise our beliefs – and for epistemology and philosophy of science more generally.

To accept Quine’s naturalism is to be an engaged participant within scientific inquiry who seeks to improve, clarify, and understand her best current scientific theories and methods using only scientific theories and methods. On Quine’s picture of methodology, the naturalist expands and revises her beliefs only against the background of a large amount of scientific theory she takes as starting points in her inquiries, justified by what she takes her best current methods to be. Relying on Quine’s general discussions of scientific method and detailed investigation of Quine’s evolving and nuanced methodology of set theory, I argue Quine believes scientific methodology admits of few principles that are both exact and applicable in all disciplines. On Quine’s view, most general principles of scientific method use notions such as ‘simple’ or ‘economical’ or ‘crucial’ that are imprecise or which express family resemblances between features of various theories. These notions can only be sharpened in particular inquiries or disciplines. In short, Quine thinks scientific methodology is *highly context sensitive*. Quine thus lacks a general as well as sharp characterization of scientific theory and method. His naturalism itself, therefore, is not a position with a sharp definition, but a rough and ready recommendation for the pursuit of truth.

Quine views the philosopher as participant in science who makes the context-sensitive judgments just sketched. One important way the philosopher participates in science (although not the only way) is by aiming to make our theories simpler and clearer. Ontology for Quine is a part of this task – for example, Quine recommends that ontologists investigate whether there are any abstract objects, such as numbers and sets. Contrary to John Burgess and Gideon Rosen’s interpretation of Quine’s naturalism, the naturalist is not required to defer to scientists outside of philosophy on the merits of revising our current commitment to what Quine calls *Platonism* – the view that there are abstract objects. She not only may assess the merits of revising our commitment to Platonism, but also will recommend we make that revision if doing so simplifies and clarifies our science. In general, Quine’s naturalistic methodology is not best understood as a deferential methodology. This reading of Quine helps to clarify the relation between Quine’s early views on abstract objects and his later views. I argue that Quine’s opposition to Platonism early in his career is not un-naturalistic, but is based on his view, which he regards as scientific, that the lack of commitment to abstract objects makes our theories clearer.

Quine rejects traditional forms of empiricism, on which all theories are ultimately justified by observation alone – given his naturalism, theories play an ineliminable role in the justification of belief. Yet he calls himself an empiricist and makes methodological judgments that seem worthy of the label ‘empiricist’. He asserts that overall scientific theories empirically equivalent to ours (roughly, theories making the same claims about the observable world as ours) are true or at least are not in conflict with ours. He also worries about the credentials of set theories which do not affect our overall theory’s empirical content (roughly, theories which add nothing to the claims about the observable world our theories make). How are these things consistent with his context-sensitive methodology and his rejection of traditional empiricism? I argue it is useful to explicate the methodological side of Quine’s empiricism as the conjunction of two *maxims*. An example of a maxim for Quine is his maxim of minimum mutilation which asks us to minimize giving up crucial beliefs in theory revision. In general, a maxim directs us to approximate, maximize, or minimize a state and is to be interpreted and weighed in context-sensitive ways.On my reading, his empiricism asks us to maximize accepting a theory empirically equivalent to ours but also to minimize accepting theories which both do not affect the empirical content of our overall theory and do not simplify it. Drawing on the Quine archive at Houghton Library at Harvard, I support and apply these interpretations by investigating his rapidly evolving later work on empirical content and empirical equivalence of scientific theory. To make sense of Quine’s appeal to naturalism in this later work, I argue it is useful to explicate Quine’s naturalism as a maxim: maximize accepting sentences that are solely supported by standards that support our best current scientific theory. Understanding Quine’s naturalism as a maxim highlights that the naturalist’s pursuit of truth is guided not by general and sharp rules but by continuities with current science that are clarified in context-sensitive ways.

Quine’s view that the philosopher participates in science by improving and clarifying the system of science parallels but modifies a view held by his mentor, Rudolf Carnap. I argue that Quine, like Carnap, has an explication of cognitive *significance* or *meaningfulness*. This explication, I argue, results from transforming Carnap’s explication of cognitive significance in light of his transformation of Carnap’s project of scientific philosophy. Both philosophers’ explications of cognitive meaningfulness are constructed so that expressions are cognitively meaningful when they can be explicated into formal languages that are fruitful for our purposes in scientific inquiry; they are cognitively meaningless otherwise. These judgments are context-sensitive because Quine thinks we cannot summarize in a general and sharp fashion what fits our scientific purposes. Thus, Quine’s context-sensitive methodology helps us to understand his views on the limits of cognitive discourse.

References

*Professor Gary Ebbs*

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*Professor Kirk Ludwig*

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*Professor Joan Weiner*

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*Professor Richard Creath*

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*(Teaching Reference) Professor Frederick Schmitt*

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