

Ralph Wedgwood

"Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic"

According to a widely held view of the matter, whenever we assess beliefs as “rational” or “justified”, we are making *normative* judgements about those beliefs. In this discussion, I shall simply assume, for the sake of argument, that this view is correct. My goal here is to explore a particular approach to understanding the basic principles that explain which of these normative judgements are true. Specifically, this approach is based on the assumption that all such normative principles are grounded in facts about *values*, and the normative principles that apply to beliefs *qua* beliefs are grounded in facts about *alethic* value—a kind of value that is exemplified by believing what is true and not believing what is false. In this discussion, I shall explain what I regard as the best way of interpreting this approach. In doing so, I shall also show how this interpretation can solve some problems that have recently been raised for approaches of this kind.