

Kant on Freedom and Morality

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In *Groundwork* III Kant warns about a suspicion of circularity in the relationship between freedom and morality. Commentators disagree whether this “kind of circle” is a *circulus in probando* (vicious circle) or a *petitio principii* (begging the question), and whether Kant avoids this alleged logical defect or not. In this talk, drawing on the entire text of the *Groundwork*, I will argue that the kind of circle is in fact *two petitiones in one non-vicious-circle*, and that Kant removes it replacing the analytical procedure by the synthetic procedure from subsection 3 of *Groundwork* III on. Actually, Kant’s critical turn in *Groundwork* III is necessary to avoid a misleading inference from freedom to morality in the case of an imperfectly rational being, as the human being. In my view, the role of the circle pointed out by Kant is to emphasize the need of shifting procedures for justifying human freedom through the critical distinction between *phenomena* and *noumena*, and human morality through the transcendental deduction of the categorical imperative.