Norms forbidding rape jokes, blackface, and flag-burning exemplify a peculiar form of etiquette, which I call political etiquette. Political etiquette norms prescribe conduct that conventionally expresses respect for marginalized social groups, and proscribe conduct that conventionally expresses disrespect. These norms support marginalized groups by shoring up assurance—that is, evidence supporting a reasonably confident judgment that these groups will be treated in accordance with their rightful social status. Yet the enforcement of political etiquette can be seen as a threat to assurance. After all, when compliance with political etiquette is enforced through social sanctions, the threat of sanction supplies all of us with pragmatic reasons to perform prescribed gestures regardless of our genuine attitudes. The existence of such a practical incentive could give members of vulnerable groups grounds to doubt the sincerity of respectful conduct, and thereby to doubt their social standing. I confront this challenge by considering the way that an insincere gesture contributes social status, and challenging the presumption that respectful behavior must give voice to respectful inner states to be valuable. My response to this objection discloses a relationship between social status and respectful attitudes that is much more complex than we might have expected.