ABSTRACT. Both defenders and critics of freedom of expression exhibit near unanimity in identifying expression with intentional communication. But there is a more explanatorily basic sense of expression under which we express ourselves whenever we manifest or make intelligible some of our states of mind. This paper defends an account of freedom of expression that treats manifestation, rather than intentional communication per se, as the fundamental case of self-expression. First, I show that identifying expression with manifestation does not have the overgeneralizing implication that all limitations on freedom limit freedom of expression, because only some limitations on freedom interfere with people’s conduct on the basis of the states of mind thereby manifested. Second, I develop a novel account of the interests persons have in not being subjected to a limitation on freedom of expression, so understood. In particular, I argue that each of us has a fundamental human interest in autonomously shaping the boundary between one’s personality, the totality of one’s mental states at a given time, and one’s persona, those aspects of one’s personality one is intelligible to others as having in a given interpersonal context. I call this the interest in autonomy of self-authorship. Limitations on freedom of expression interfere with a person’s autonomy of self-authorship. Interestingly, so too do invasions of privacy, albeit in the opposite direction.