

In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief

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Many meta-ethicists are *alethists*: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. In this talk, I argue that two popular strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. I argue that the first strategy shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the second strategy is simply wrong – we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief.