Central claims in Kant’s critical philosophy include the unity of consciousness as a necessary condition of the possibility of experience, the centrality of autonomy as a characterization of our practical reason, and the idea of moral requirements as requirements of reason, which are clear to ordinary humans. This suggests a picture of ordered, unified, autonomous rational agents aware of what morality requires and transparent to themselves. And because the account is a priori, it suggests that a Kantian account of human moral agency is unsituated and ahistorical - a liberal, transparent, transcendent subject. On the other hand, Kant believes that actual humans in the actual human condition are corrupt, opaque to themselves and systematically self-deceived about the requirements of morality and about their own lives and motivations. The aim of this paper is to suggest that these parts of Kant’s position are not in tension with each other but rather complementary parts of his complete picture: far from having an unsituated account of agency, Kant’s picture of the way our agency is systematically and structurally flawed follows from putting together our actual circumstances (situatedness) with his abstract and a priori account of the nature of practical reason.